Corruption is one of the most pervasive obstacles to economic and social development. However, in the existing literature it appears that corruption seems to be less harmful in some countries than in others. The most striking examples are well known as the "East Asian paradox": countries displaying exceptional growth records despite having thriving corruption cultures. The aim of this paper is to explain the high corruption but fast economic growth puzzle in China by providing …rm-level evidence of the relation between corruption and growth and investigating how …nancial development in ‡uences the former relationship. Our empirical results show that corruption is likely to contribute to …rms' growth. We further highlight the substitution relationship between corruption and …nancial development on …rm growth. This means that corruption appears not to be a vital constraint on …rm growth if …nancial markets are underdeveloped. However, pervasive corruption deters …rm growth where there are more developed …nancial markets. This implies that fast …rm growth will not be observed until a later stage of China's development when …nancial markets are well-functioning and corruption is under control. Furthermore, the substitution relationship exists in the private and state-owned …rms. Geographically, similar results can be seen in the Southeast and Central regions.
Introduction
Bureaucratic corruption is pervasive throughout the world. 1 The relationship between corruption and economic growth has been broadly studied in the literature. Corruption is one of the most pervasive obstacles to economic growth and social development, as it is well observed that some countries with poor economic performance also su¤er from severe corruption. From the theoretical point of view, many researchers attempt to explain this phenomenon by addressing various issues in the macroeconomics of misgovernance (e.g., Ehrlich and Lui, 1999; Sarte, 2000) . A considerable amount of empirical evidence shows that corruption directly deters economic growth and development (e.g., Keefer and Knack, 1997; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Li et al., 2000; Méon and Sekkat, 2005) . Others explore the principal transmission mechanism through which corruption reduces investment and hence, hampers economic growth (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001) .
However, it is reasonable to be cautious about the strong negative correlation between corruption and growth. The incidence of corruption may vary markedly across countries, and signi…cant diversity clearly exists conditional on other social and economic factors. Neeman et al. (2008) …nd that the negative relationship between corruption and growth holds only for countries with a high degree of …nancial openness. In contrast, for those countries with less …nancial integration, the negative relationship more or less disappears. Aidt et al. (2008) show that quality of institutions substantially a¤ects the impact of corruption on economic growth: corruption is detrimental to growth where there are high-quality political institutions, but otherwise has no impact on growth. Similar results can also be seen in Méon and Weill (2010) who observe that corruption is less harmful to e¢ ciency in countries with less e¤ective institutions, and may even improve e¢ ciency where there are extremely ine¤ective institutions. The results of Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) indicate that the level of corruption which maximizes growth is signi…cantly greater than zero. That is, corruption bene…ts growth at low levels of economic development and becomes detrimental to growth as the economy develops to a high level.
It seems that not all countries over the world have su¤ered from widespread corruption, while some countries have coped well. The most prominent examples form the basis of what Wedeman (2002) termed the "East Asian paradox": some countries in this region, such as China, Indonesia, South Korea 2 and Thailand, have grown remarkably well in spite of high levels of corruption. 3 Campos et al. (1999) show that corruption has less negative impact on investment when it is more predictable -being more organised with less uncertainty. Rock and Bonnett (2004) point out that the negative relationship between corruption and investment exists only in small developing countries, but displays positive correlation in the large East Asian newly industrialised economies (China, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and Japan). Given all the above, corruption appears to be less harmful to economic growth in "East Asian paradox" countries, among which China is the most striking example. 4 Since the early 1980s, China has been one of the most rapidly growing economies in the world with an average annual growth rate of around 10%. At the same time however, corruption continues to thrive in China along with economic reforms. Why does corruption not slow down economic growth in China? Would China grow even faster if corruption were lower? In this paper, we aim to investigate how corruption a¤ects economic growth in China. In particular, we intend to see how …nancial development in ‡uences the former relationship. 5 To our knowledge, empirical studies on corruption and growth in China remain scarce. A few cross country macro-level studies have China in their sample (e.g., Méon and Sekkat, 2005; Neeman et al., 2008; Rock and Bonnett, 2004) , though the results are mixed as we mentioned above. Fisman and Svensson (2007) argue that cross country analysis is unable to tell us much about the e¤ect of corruption on individual …rms, which may lead to suspicion of the existence of the negative role of corruption for growth at the micro-level. Moreover, cross country studies neither allow us to analysis variation of corruption within country nor to examine individual heterogeneity. In addition, many factors a¤ecting individual …rms may not appear in aggregate macroeconomic statistics. It is possible, and has been proved preted as "money politics", which highlights the interaction between public and private. 3 Even some developed countries share the same notoriety, such as Italy. 4 A few theoretical papers have also attempted to explain the puzzle of high levels of corruption but fast economic growth in "East Asian paradox" countries (see Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009; Blackburn and Wang, 2009) . 5 A country's …nancial development plays an increasingly important role in economic growth. There is not much doubt that better access to …nance correlates with higher growth and investment in developing countries. A great deal of research demonstrates that a well developed …nancial market promotes economic growth (e.g., Guiso et al., 2004; Levine, 1997) . See also World Bank (2001) for a detailed review. In China, …nancial market liberalization started in the early 1990s, when the policy banks started to be separated from commercial banks. Despite the reforms, Chinese …rms access less formal …nance than other Asian countries according to the World Bank (2003) . Many studies emphasize the prevalence of capital market imperfections in China, from both macro (e.g., Allen et al., 2005; Guariglia and Poncet, 2008) and micro (e.g., Héricourt and Poncet, 2009; Guariglia et al., 2011) perspectives. by Svensson (2003) , that though corruption deters economic growth at the macro-level, bribe payments correlate positively with a cross-section …rm growth in Uganda. Recently, …rm-level research of corruption in China has been conducted by the World Bank Group. Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2004) used …rm-level data from …ve cities (Beijing, Chengdu, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Tianjin) in 2002 and found that external …nance signi…cantly improves …rm performance and the total number of days in dealing with government inspectors positively a¤ects …rms'sales growth, though the magnitude is very small. By using the same data, World Bank (2003) shows that corruption, measured as an index comprising the governance e¤ectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, the frequency and size of irregular payments, has negative impact on …rms'growth rates of sales, but the impact is not statistically signi…cant.
This paper aims to investigate the impact of corruption, together with the comovement of corruption and …nancial development, on …rm growth in China. In the existing literature, only very limited cross-country studies attempt to investigate the interaction between corruption and …nancial development on economic growth. The empirical results of Ahlin and Pang (2008) show that corruption control and …nancial development both improve economic performance. The worse either of these, the greater the marginal bene…t from an improvement in the other. Compton and Giedeman (2011) …nd similar results that banking development has reduced e¤ect on growth when the institution quality is improved. The alternative results can be seen in Demetriades and Law (2006) , who …nd that both institution improvement and …nancial development are necessary conditions for stimulating growth. In addition, their results show that institutional improvement would bring more economic growth in low-income countries, while …nancial development could generate more growth in middle-income and high-income countries but with smaller magnitude. There is no micro-level study paying attention to the in ‡uence of interaction between corruption and …nancial development on …rm growth. We intend to …ll this gap in the literature. We also aim to detect the impact of the interaction between corruption and …nancial development on …rm growth cross ownership and regions. As economic reforms continue, various types of ownership ‡ourish in China replacing unitary state ownership. In addition, there is a broad consensus that China is undergoing an uneven growth pattern in di¤erent geographic regions -Eastern and coastal areas being more developed than Western and landlocked areas. It is therefore worth investigating whether corruption and its interaction with …nancial development play a di¤erent role across types of ownership and regions.
Our empirical analysis shows that the growth of …rm sales income per employee is likely to bene…t from both …nancial development in terms of easier access to formal loans and the presence of corruption, that is, corruption and …nancial development both appear to stimulate …rm growth. Furthermore, there exists evidence of substitution between the growth-enhancing e¤ects of corruption and …nancial development. Meaning that the slower …nancial development the less the marginal e¤ect from an improvement in governance and so the greater is the marginal bene…t from misconduct. However, the bene…t from the presence of corruption diminishes as the improvement in …nancial market continues, and eventually it deters …rm growth. Once we look at the di¤erent types of ownership and regions, results are consistent with the full sample estimation though the magnitude varies accordingly. The substitution relationship is particularly evident in the private and stateowned …rms. Consistent results can also be seen in the Southeast and Central regions as well.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Section 2 explores the data. Section 3 introduces the methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical results. We make a few concluding remarks in Section 5.
Data

Data Description
We use the Investment Climate Survey conducted by the National Bureau Statistics of China in 2005. 6 The survey interviewed 12,400 …rms in 30 out of 34 Chinese provinces. 7 Those …rms which could not supply data on key indicators (corruption and …nancial development) and reported unrealistic …rm age are excluded. 8 As a result, the sample used in the empirical analysis contains 12,212 …rms. Only Tibet, Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan are not included in the sample. Therefore, our data represent geographical China. As Table 1 indicates, 1 to 9 sample cities are drawn from each province. There is only 1 sample city in Hainan, Qinghai and Xinjiang, except for 4 directly administered municipalities. Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong 6 The corresponding data were downloaded from World Bank, Enterprise Surveys. In addition, we use the report of World Bank (2006) for helping us construct our variables. See Appendix, Table A1 for details. 7 34 provinces consist of 23 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 directly administered municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing) and 2 special administrative regions (Hong Kong and Macau) . 8 In the survey, …rms are asked to report in which year they were established. Some …rms reported a number smaller than 1000, which is unrealistic. We therefore trim o¤ the highest 1% according to the distribution of …rm age. In our constructed sample, the oldest …rm was established in 1947 and the youngest in 2002. Table 1: Distribution of sample cities provide more sample cities than other provinces, with 9 cities in each. Following World Bank (2006) , 30 sample provinces are divided into six regions (see Table 2 ). The Southeast includes the most sample cities, followed by Bohai and then the Central. As a result, the regional share of sample …rms is highest in the Southeast. However, it seems that there is no substantial sample bias in terms of regions which can been seen from Column (3) of Table 2 .
There are 31 industries in our data, among which the bulk-goods industry 9 accounts for the most, which is 73.6%. The low-value industry, agricultural and side-line food processing, follows (25.6%) and high-value industry has the smallest proportion in the entire sample at 0.8%. Small and medium sized …rms, which are thought to be the "backbone" of the economy and to help reduce the bias of …rm level studies of corruption (World Bank, 2003) , are also well represented in the sample. In our sample, the median number of employees is 255, while only 10% recruit more than two thousand employees. The summary statistics of all variables are given in Appendix, Table A2 .
Along with the decentralised enterprise reform in China, …rms become increasingly hybrid. The cooperation and partial privatization of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China has delegated authority by allocating managers some e¤ective control rights such as production and income distribution, while leaving the ultimate power with the government such as the appointment and dismissal of the general manager and the approval of large investment proposals (e.g., Qian, 1996) . The state-owned assets management 9 Bulk goods industry includes the production of raw chemical materials and chemical products, nonmetal mineral products and smelting and processing of (non)ferrous metals. departments or agencies also in ‡uence private …rms by share trading, acquisitions or merger. There are fewer …rms with private shares alone and these are usually smaller size. Our sample re ‡ects this phenomenon. 53.2% of sample …rms have a single kind of shares, the remaining are hybrid. The fully private-owned …rms, accounting for 14.5% of the full sample, have 402 employees on average. In comparison, the average number of employee is 1,142 in purely state owned …rms whose share is 29.9%. 8.8% of …rms only have foreign shares. About 32% …rms have three kinds of shares in their ownership. At the same time, it is also di¢ cult to de…ne the private sector in China. Some consider the nonstate sector is private sector. A better but narrow de…nition is given by Haggard and Huang (2008) , where it is called the "de jure" private sector including …rms registered as private entities under Chinese law. Taking into account this di¢ culty and …rms'hybrid features, when classifying …rm ownership, we do not refer to …rms'registration type, but to their actual shareholder structure following Dollar and Wei (2007) . A …rm is considered to be a state-owned …rm if the state shares dominate others. Privately-owned and foreign-owned …rms are de…ned analogously.
Construction of Main Explanatory Variables
Before proceeding, it is useful to explore in-depth the features of key explanatory variables. Corruption is di¢ cult to de…ne as it can take various forms and is even more di¢ cult to measure due to its inherent secrecy. In this paper, we use objective measure of corruption rather than subjective indicators which could be less precise and sometimes biased (see Dethier et al., 2010) . Among objective corruption indicators, some studies use the amount of bribery as a direct measure of corruption (e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 2007) . Though these questionnaires are better designed and try to ask the quantity of bribes in a more implicit manner, such direct measurement still su¤ers from hidden information or even potential falsity due to moral hazard.
Our corruption is measured as the proportion of days within a year that a …rm interacts with four government departments -taxation, public security, environment, labour and social security. We do so out of two considerations. For one thing, according to World Bank (2003), …rm's cost which is induced by the share of time that senior managers spend receiving government o¢ cials can re ‡ect the cumbersome nature of dealing with extensive regulations. This can be a further indication of corruption. For another, this measure broadly captures possible bureaucratic malpractice with easy and less biased responses from interviews. One may suppose that bureaucratic rent seeking only in ‡uences the fundamental decision of entrepreneurs, such as opening business, merging or claiming bankruptcy. However, corrupt practices may also be involved in …rms' day-to-day operations, which can take many forms and shapes. For example, illegal payment to persuade tax inspectors 10 , bribery to obtain and/or speed up the compulsory licenses (or permits) during production or for future production, entertainment spending to smooth relationships or build networks. As showned in Figure 1 , 2.5% of …rms did not spend any time on corrupt practices. If 0 indicates no time spent on corruption and 1 indicates the whole year dealing with corruption, the average corruption level across all …rms is 0.15 (54 days) and the median time is 0.11 (39 days).
Our corruption measurement shows credibility. It correlates positively with …rms'entertainment and travel costs (ETC) shown in Figure 3 , which is demonstrated to be a proxy capturing some real bribes committed by Chinese …rms in Cai et al. (2011). 11 In our questionnaire, …rms are asked to evaluate (or predict) the role of local government, if they have made (or will carry out) acquisitions or mergers within a …ve-year window. We …nd a positive correlation between this indicator and our corruption measurement: Figure 3 : The relationship between corruption and ETC the better a …rm's evaluation (or prediction), the more time the …rm spends with government departments. This implies that some time might have been used to build networks with government in order to facilitate …rms'production plans. Having said this, measurement errors are likely to persist to some extent in corruption research due to the secretive nature of corrupt behavior and the corruption data (e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 2007) . Our measurement cannot cover every aspect, nor allow us to identify the purpose of corruption due to limited information.
Financial development is represented by how easy it is for …rms to get formal loans compared with previous years. Informal loans, albeit widely existed, are not considered here, given that our aim is to study the impact of formal sector on …rm growth. On average, …nance is still under developed at the …rm level, with the mean being 2.93. Only less than 10% of sample …rms felt they had easier access to loans from legal …nancial and banking institutions. About half of …rms found it more di¢ cult to obtain loans and about 15% reported no access to loans at all, which is in line with Haggard and Huang's (2008) conclusion that …rms found more di¢ culties in accessing formal …nance in 1990s than in 1980s.
Substantial disparities appear, once we look at the distribution according to ownership. Figure 4 indicates that the highest corruption level can be seen in the state-owned …rms, which is 36% and 18% higher than in the privately-owned and foreign-owned …rms. The lowest corruption appears in the privately-owned …rms, which is 0.127 and equivalent to 46 days. As with Figure 5 ), foreign-owned …rms account for most of those reporting easier access to loans, while the state-owned …rms account for least. The distribution for foreign-owned …rms is heavily skewed to the right, indicating a better …nancial environment. By contrast, many stateowned …rms appear to have equally experienced 1 to 4 categories of …nancial development, from "can't get loans" to "no changes". Figure 5 also shows that the distribution for privately-owned …rms is quite symmetric: most of them lie in category 3 (a bit more di¢ cult), while those reporting 1 (cannot get loans) and 5 (easier to get loans) are less. Whatever groups we look at, the average …nancial development is less than 4, which indicates that …rms, on average, did not perceive better access to loans compared with previous years.
Given the uneven progress of development in China, there are also substantial regional disparities in the level of corruption and …nancial development. The shapes of regional distribution of corruption, which are drawn in Figure 6 , are very similar to the full sample, but distinct from each other in extent. The Southeast and Central areas have lower corruption than the sample mean: their average level of corruption is equivalent to 47 days. The highest corruption can be seen in Bohai and the Northwest, where the average number of days for interacting with the government departments is 64 and 62, respectively. By contrast, as shown in Figure 7 , the Southeast (Northwest) that experienced the highest (lowest) …nancial development. Only …rms in the Southeast on average reported "a bit more" di¢ culty in obtaining loans. In other regions, however, the average …rm su¤ered "much more" di¢ culties in getting external …nance. For more accurate numbers, refer to the average level of …nancial development at the regional level in Column (6) of Table 2 .
Firm Growth Measurement
Firm growth can be measured by various indicators, such as growth rates of …rm sales income, …rm pro…ts, employment and investment. 12 In this paper, we use the growth rate of …rm sales income, which is in line with Fisman and Svensson (2007) and also due to the following considerations.
First, the combination of di¤erent types of shareholders in China could bring di¤erent objectives to Chinese …rms. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue that controlling party may not have pro…t-miximizing objectives, especially for the state shareholders. State may put increasing social welfare for the public in priority. For China's case, especially local government, have incentives to extract revenue from …rms on which they have control at their disposal and then maximize pro…t (e.g., Qian and Stiglitz, 1996) . Private shareholders are more concerned with maximizing their share value in case of using shares as collateral, and/or …rm's stock price if they wish to divest holdings in the stock market (Firth et al., 2006) . In general, maximization of growth rate of sales income could better proxy for the goals of many management groups (Baumol, 1962) .
Second, given the hybrid ownership and managerial discretion in Chinese …rms, managers' incentives are neither very transparent nor easy to measure as indicated in Cai et al. (2011) . The compensation of top managers or CEOs are not always related to …rm performance. Even for those where top managers' income and the …rm's performance are correlated, expanding managerial discretion could be accompanied by high agency costs when managers tend to experience a lack of accountability and external monitor (Qian, 1996) , and managers would rather seek unobserved income (Qian and Stiglitz, 1996) . Hence, …rm sales income is an appropriate indicator to capture the realities.
Third, Cai et al. (2011) conclude that estimation based on the …rm's pro…ts should be treated with caution as losses could be caused by a …rm's genuine failure in business as well as a …rm's false claim. Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to distinguish between them. Moreover, pro…t hiding has been a long and widespread phenomenon among Chinese …rms. Qian and Xu (1993) state that pro…t hiding for state-owned …rms stems from the multilayer-multi-region (M-form) hierarchy in terms of both vertical and horizontal interdependence. As the M-form economy becomes more decentralized, the bottom level local governments are endowed with more autonomy in policy making and more responsible for local economic development. Consequently, competition of growing and getting richer rises across regions at the horizontal line, which then passes greater pressure on local governments along the vertical line (C. . Therefore, as can be seen in Qian and Stiglitz (1996) , the state shareholders, especially lower-level governments and their agencies, tempt to hide pro…ts in order to avoid the interference and predation from higher-level governments. By doing so, lower-level governments are able to hold wealth and resources, which can be used to boost local economy. Better economic performance is in turn used to bargain with the higher-level governments along the vertical line for favorable o¤ers and through bargaining to get ahead of other regions along the horizontal line. Privately-owned …rms are worried more about the government's predation, hence rationally hide excessive revenue by engaging in short-term or liquid projects (Qian, 2002) .
Given the mixed and sometimes unobserved incentives and pro…t hiding behavior, we therefore believe that an indicator like sales income would produce more reliable estimation results. Considering larger …rms may be more visible to bureaucrats (e.g., Fisman and Svensson, 2007) and therefore have to spend more time dealing with government departments. We take into account this size e¤ect by using the number of employees to normalize …rm sales income, and further including log of …rm's initial sales and log of …rm's age as control variables as suggested by Fisman and Svensson (2007) . In addition, log of …rm's size is also included as a regressor in the estimation which will be discussed more in Section 4.
The survey we used has only one cross section, however, the NBSC recorded the …nancial statements of …rms for 2003, 2004 and 2005 , which allows us to calculate …rm growth. The …rm is indexed by i and its average growth g i over the period 2003-2005 is calculated as the log di¤erence of its total sales income per employee:
As the aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship between corruption and …rm growth, it is useful to explore …rst whether they are correlated. Figure 8 (a) clearly indicates that the more days spent with government departments, the higher the …rm growth. This contradicts the general knowledge of corruption deterring growth. Somehow, corruption may be less harmful for …rm growth in China, or may even help with …rm growth. Figure 8(b) shows that the improved access to loans also assists …rm growth and with a narrower con…dence interval, which is consistent with the general lit-erature of better …nance promoting growth. Comparing (a) and (b), it seems that the e¤ect of corruption on growth is much larger than that of …nancial development.
Methodology
Empirically, we begin by estimating a basic growth regression, in order to study the impact of corruption and …nancial development on …rm growth, and further investigate the interaction between corruption and …nancial development on …rm growth.
where g i denotes the two-year average growth rate of …rm sales income. C i measures the level of corruption, which is presented by the proportion of days within a year that the …rm interacts with four government departments. F D i denotes the …nancial development experienced by the …rm, measured by how more or less di¢ cult the …rm …nds obtaining loans from legal …nancial institutions compared with previous years. A set of dummies D c controls for other unobserved covariates at the city level. i is a white-noise error. X i includes various …rm characteristics and business climate indicators which are suspicious to be correlated with …rm performance in terms of sales income.
The selection of such variables are informed by the existing empirical literature through a "general-to-speci…c" approach suggested by Dethier et al. (2010) . 13 Speci…cally, Fisman and Svensson (2007) provide the most relevant empirical study on corruption and growth of …rm sales income. Among various control variables, they …nd that taxation, whether doing international trade and having foreign ownership account the most of …rm growth. In their study, …rms' initial sales income is used as an explanatory variables to control the possible correlation between …rm size and future growth "as larger organizations are more visible to bureaucrats" (Fisman and Svensson, 2007, p.69) . According to the comprehensive review conducted by Dethier et al. (2010) and L. , many other factors may also play a role in explaining …rm performance, such as the …rm age, the number of employees, industry type, capital stock, innovation and learning, openness in terms of both inter-provincial and international trade, human capital, labour relation and status, market competition and regulation, infrastructure, and characteristics of the city/region where the …rm is located. We begin with estimating (1) by a complete set of the aforementioned variables and then, pick up sig-ni…cant ones that best …t our data (i.e., a testing-down approach) 14 . Detailed construction and justi…cation of …nally included variables are spelled out in Appendix, Table A1 . Among all regressors, corruption is presumably positively correlated with …rm growth in China. Therefore, one may expect a positive^ 1 . Financial development are predicted to stimulate …rm growth, which leads to a positivê 2 . The sign of^ 3 , together with the former two estimated coe¢ cients, points to either substituting or complementary roles of corruption and …nancial development on growth. More speci…cally, for each …rm, the total marginal e¤ects of corruption and …nancial development on growth conditional on the other can be calculated as follows.
Nevertheless, there is a typical concern over the above growth regression on the endogeneity of corruption. 15 This problem might arise if those …rms experiencing higher growth also devoted more e¤orts to handling relationships with government departments. A fair amount of empirical evidence suggests the reverse causation from economic growth to corruption, meaning that the incidence of corruption is determined by the level of economic development (e.g., Fisman and Gatti, 2002; Husted, 1999; Montinola and Jackman, 1999; Paldam, 2002; Rauch and Evans, 2000; Treisman, 2000) . Kaufmann and Wei (2000) demonstrate that bureaucrats have discretionary power given a certain regulation and would extort bribes according to a …rm's ability to pay. The empirical work of Svensson (2003) shows that the bribe payments are positively correlated with …rm growth in Uganda.
We address the possible endogeneity issue by adopting two speci…cations. First, following Fisman and Svensson (2007) , we use the industry-location averages of corruption ( at the city level) as instruments of the presence corruption level. It is plausible that bureaucrats'preference and behaviour in extracting bribes di¤er across locations and industries. It is therefore supposed that industry-location averages are closely correlated with …rms'practice of corruption but little with the growth of their sales. 16 A standard instrumental two-step least square (IV-2SLS) estimation is applied to (1). That is …rst estimating a corruption determination regression with the instruments and all other explanatory variables except for corruption itself, and then substituting the predicted values of corruption into the growth regression and using standard OLS. Second, considering the endogenous selection of …rms on whether to be corrupt, we implement the Heckman two-step method. In the …rst step, let c i = 1 (c i = 0) denote engaging (not engaging) in corruption. 17 The probability of making such a decision for a …rm is expressed by the following probit regression.
where z 0 i includes all explanatory variables in (1) except for corruption and interaction term of corruption and …nancial development, plus two additional instruments (whether the …rm sells products to government and whether the general manager is directly appointed by government). ( ) is the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Estimating (3) by maximum likelihood method, yields the inverse Mills ratio, i =
where ( ) denotes the standard normal density function. The inverse Mills ratio indicates the conditional probability of undertaking corruption given that the …rm i had not been corrupt. In the second step, inserting the inverse Mills ratio into (1) gives the new growth regression to be estimated by OLS.
The error terms u i and i are jointly bivariate normally distributed, N (0; 0; 2 ; 2 u ; u ). They are correlated through the correlation coe¢ cient u , but independent with both sets of explanatory variables in (3) and (4). Clearly, (4) makes …rm growth depend on common factors that jointly a¤ect …rms'decisions on being corrupt and their growth rates. In other words, including i allows the determinants of corruption to in ‡uence growth as well. Therefore, a statistically signi…cant^ 6 indicates the existence of endogeneity. 18 16 The correlation coe¢ cient between our instruments and the corruption variable is 0.46, while it is only 0.04 with …rm growth. 17 Given that our data do not directly record whether …rms decide to be corrupt, a proxy of c i is given as follows. First, c i = 1 if the …rm has specialised sta¤ to handle government relationships. Second, c i = 1 if the …rm's corruption variable is higher than a certain percentile in the distribution of corruption across all …rms. Speci…cally, we use 75th and 50th percentiles, respectively.
18 Actually, b 6 =^ u^ 2 . Hence, a bigger^ u also points to the endogenous selection.
One may also consider that more money needed to engage in corrupt practices could increase the demand for external funding and hence, corruption and …nancial development indicators are correlated. However, this is not a serious problem in our data as the correlation coe¢ cient between corruption and …nancial development is very small, -0.026. The reason might be that our …nancial development indicator is not an "objective" measure of …rms' …nancial constraints, but rather the perception and judgement of the di¢ culties in obtaining loans from formal …nancial institutions. Such "subjective" measures may be more relevant to the local banking system, but independent of the level of corruption that an individual …rm commits.
Empirical Results
Main Results
Our model speci…cation has good acceptance. The statistically signi…cant coe¢ cients of i in Columns (6) and (8), i.e., b 6 in (4), suggest that there exists a problem of endogeneity, meaning there are some common but unobserved factors simultaneously a¤ecting a …rm's decision on being corrupt and growth. Moreover, the positive value of b 6 implies that these unobserved or omitted factors that make …rms more likely to corrupt also generate growth. To address the endogeneity issue, it can be seen that our choice of instrument, i.e., the industry-location (at the city level) averages of corruption, passes all instrument tests as indicated in the last three rows in Columns (1)-(3). In Columns (4) and (5), we further use whether the …rm has specialized sta¤ to handle the government relations as a complementary …rm-level instrument to the industry-location averages of corruption. It appears to be valid as the Sargan test is passed with Sargan statistic 0.185 and 0.106 in Columns (4) and (5) respectively, i.e., the null hypothesis of exogenous instruments is con…rmed. There are no distinct estimates across the …rst four columns.
Most explanatory variables suggest the expected signs and show high robustness across di¤erent model speci…cations. From the view of production, switching from either the low-or high-value goods industry to the bulk-goods industry and higher openness in terms of both exports and inter-provincial trade can bring more income for …rms. A younger …rm is more capable of generating more sales income, and so are those who accumulated more …xed assets in the initial year. A higher level of utilized production capacity is usually correlated with higher productivity and indicates that unproductive …rms might have exited the market (Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2004) . A positive correlation between production capacity and …rm growth is therefore (2007), a lower level of government expropriation in terms of less burden of taxes and fees stimulates …rm growth. They also argue that greater foreign ownership would bring greater resources, access to markets and advanced technologies to …rms and hence make them grow faster. The share of foreign ownership in our estimation provide further support to this argument. Moreover, a higher share of state ownership is likely to promote …rm growth, which is consistent with Jiang et al. (2008) who …nd that share of state ownership tend to positively a¤ect Chinese …rm performance over the period [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . At the moment, the only seemingly unclear variable is …rm size. Generally speaking, smaller …rms intend to have faster growth. It may also be the case that bigger …rms expand their sales income more due to the larger market power. We will return to this point later.
Both …nancial development and corruption are likely to push …rms to grow further in all model speci…cations, which is consistent with exploratory analysis in Figure 8 . Better chance to access external …nance will promote …rm growth due to the imperfection in Chinese capital markets as argued by Poncet et al. (2010) . The positive e¤ect of corruption is not only drawn from the positive estimated coe¢ cient, but also from the positive correlation between residuals in (3) and (4). The correlation coe¢ cient b u decreases slightly from 0.86 in Column (6) to 0.82 in Column (8). The LR test of zero correlation coe¢ cient is rejected at the 1% signi…cance level for all columns from (6) to (8). This indicates that the …rms which elect to be corrupt do have higher growth rates relative to those with average characteristics randomly drawn from the population.
According to Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2004) , the positive relationship between the presence of corruption and …rm growth may have two reasons. First, the one who grows fast may attract more attention from public o¢cials, hence need to spend more time on dealing with government departments. Second, the one who plans to grow fast may require new licenses (or permits) for future production and hence increase meeting time with public o¢ cials. The second point of view is also in alignment with Cai et al. (2011) . They use a …rm's ETC as the proxy for corruption and demonstrate that not all corruption components worsen …rm growth, although …nding an overall negative correlation between corruption and growth in 18 Chinese cities. More speci…cally, they …nd that the bribery component of ETC, which acts as the "grease" and/or "protection" money, brings positive returns to …rms. Extended from the idea of Cai et al. (2011) , if the proportion of "good corruption" components -the one used as "grease" and/or "protection" money to improve government e¢ ciency -dominates the negative e¤ect induced by the "bad corruption" components, it is possible to observe empirically a positive relationship between …rm growth and the presence of corruption. 19 This is also consistent with the well-known "speed money" hypothesis (e.g., Huntington, 1968; Le¤, 1964; Leys, 1970; Lui, 1985) . Corruption may help circumvent cumbersome regulations (red tape), hence improve e¢ ciency extended to stimulate economic growth. 20 The "good corruption" components are used as "speed money", which could promote …rm growth by overcoming the less e¢ cient regulations. 21 Our micro-level results in China provides further support to the macro-level study of Rock and Bonnett (2004) .It also 19 In Column (5) of Table 3 , we experimented with ETC per employee as another proxy for corruption. Our previous …nding still remain valid. 20 The measurement of business entry by Djankov et al. (2002) shows that China required 12 procedures to start a business, more than the average of 10 in 85 sample countries. In addition, it takes 92 days to complete all procedures, which is far more longer than the sample average of 47 days. 21 The nature of corruption may be another possible explanation. A few theoretical papers demonstrate that corruption is less harmful to economic growth in China because of the organised nature of corruption which internalises the externalities by reducing the uncertainty of rent seeking (see Blackburn and Forgues-Puccio, 2009; Blackburn and Wang, 2009). turns out that the magnitude of the positive impact of corrupt practices is greater than that of …nancial development, which has also been illustrated earlier in Figure 8 . 22 Of particular interest is the fact that the estimated coe¢ cient of the interaction term is statistically negative. This indicates that, given the positive in ‡uence of …nancial development (or corruption) on growth, more days spent in interactions with government departments (or better access to loans) tend to reduce the growth-enhancing e¤ect of the other. In other words, there exists a substitution relationship between …nancial development and corruption. A corruption (or …nancial development) threshold, in which the positive impact of …nancial development (or corruption) on growth vanishes, can be calculated by using (2). In this sub-section, we use Column (3) of Table 3 which contains all three key explanatory variables. As shown in Figure 9 (a), the corruption threshold is 0.19 (70 days a year) for the full sample. Hence, …nancial development can promote …rm sales income growth only if a …rm spends less than 70 days a year on dealing with government departments. About 73% …rms in our sample devoted less than 70 days a year to corrupt practises. Among these …rms, 72% are in the bulk-goods industry and 61% are located in the Southeast and Central. By analogy, the …nancial development threshold is found to be 3.75. This indicates that corruption is bene…cial to …rm sales income growth only if the level of …nancial development is lower than "no changes", i.e., still facing same level of di¢ culty for …rms to obtain loans compared with previous years. From Figure 7 , it can be seen that only a very small proportion of …rms reported that it became easier to get loans in any region, meaning that there was no signi…cant improvement in …nancial markets and banking systems in providing loans. However, as clearly indicated in Figure 9 (b), the growth caused by corruption diminishes as …nancial markets become better functioned and there exists a growth-reducing e¤ect once across the …nancial development threshold. This implies that if there exists a less restricted capital market, the presence of corruption is meaningless as "speed money" and ultimately destructive. This argument on the transitory role of corruption during di¤erent stages of …nancial development could be extended to the cases of other institutional development. 22 The Wald test, H 0 : b 1 = b 2 , is rejected at 1% signi…cance levels from Columns (2) to (4). Note: a. Columns (1)-(3) use industry-location averages (at the city level) of the relevant corruption indicator as the instruments. Besides these, Columns (4)-(5) further uses whether the firm has specialised staff to handle government relationships as the additional instrument.
b. The first stage of endogenous selection model is not reported. Column (6) uses whether the firm has specialised staff to handle relationships withgovernment departments as the indicator of corruption in the selection equation. Column (7) (or 8) assumes that the firm is corrupt in the selection equation if its corruption variable is above the 75 th (or 50 th ) percentile of the distribution of corruption across all firms.
c. Anderson canonical correlations likelihood-ratio is used to test for the null hypothesis that the equation is under-identified. The statistic follows a χ 2 distribution.
d. Constants are not reported. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% of significance levels. Standard errors are in the parentheses.
It is also interesting to explore the possible interplay between corruption and …rm size that may alter the impact of corruption on growth. As seen in Columns (4) of Table 3 , when including the interaction term of corruption and …rm size, the estimated coe¢ cient of …rm size becomes positive, while the interaction term is negative. 23 This implies some degrees of substitutions between …rm size and corruption on promoting …rm growth. More speci…cally, increasing corruption brings more growth for small …rms than for the large. One possible explanation is that big …rms and public section may have involved in a "mutual hostages game" which is alignment with the South Korea case in old time as mentioned in Kang (2002) . Small …rms usually could not have this privilege. Therefore, once practicing the same amount of corruption, small …rms could bene…t more. When we control for this substitution e¤ect, …rm size positively a¤ects the growth. The statistically negative estimates of …rm size in Columns (1)-(3) are a net outcome of substitution e¤ect of corruption and the growth-increasing e¤ect of …rm size per se.
Ownership Heterogeneity
We further detect whether a variety of ownership alters the estimation results revealed in the full sample. To see this, we use the speci…cation of Column (3) of Table 3 to re-estimate the growth regression for sub-groups with di¤erent ownership. As we stated in Section 2.1, a …rm's ownership is classi…ed by the dominated share amount all. For example, if state share is dominant, the …rm is marked as a state-owned …rm. We …nd consistent results for both state-owned and privately-owned …rms as in the full sample.
Corruption and …nancial development impose positive impact on …rm growth and their interaction term appears to be negative in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 . Our estimation results suggest stronger direct impact of corruption and …nancial development on …rm sales income growth in the privately-owned …rms than in the state-owned …rms. One additional day spending in corruption increases privately-owned …rm growth by 0.58%. In comparison, the magnitude of this direct growth-enhancing impact is only half of that, 0.29%, in the state-owned …rms. In reality, most …rms seem not to spend too many days a year dealing with government departments. As illustrated in Figure 1 , the median corruption level in our sample is 39 days. Unlimited growth would not occur if …rms simply resorted to increasing (2004) state that …rms require additional permits or licenses if they plan to expand or innovate and therefore, need to spend more time handling relationships with o¢ cials. This may be experienced by the private-owned …rms rather than the state-owned ones as the latter have already established close relationships with the government. 24 Li et al. (2008) also demonstrates that government imposes heavy regulations (red tape) on private …rms in China. However, the private …rms are usually more e¢ cient and productive than the SOEs and serve as the engine of growth in China (e.g., Guariglia et al., 2011; Poncet et al., 2010) . Hence, if corruption e¤ectively reduces the waiting time, extended to stronger positive e¤ect on growth, it is reasonable to see that the former performs better than the latter when they both spend one additional day on corruption.
One may also consider that corruption should generate more growth in the state-owned …rms, as managers have better relationships with government departments and get used to dealing with bureaucrats. In this case however, once there is less uncertainty of corrupt practices between managers and Figure 11 : Total marginal e¤ect of C on g conditional on F D, by ownership relevant bureaucrats, corruption is equivalent to an additional tax. Therefore, it is less e¢ cient as "speed money" extended to generate less growth for the state-owned …rms.
The direct impact of …nancial development is also bigger for the privatelyowned …rms. One categorical increase in …nancial development for privatelyowned …rms brings about 8% more growth, while 6.9% in the case of stateowned …rms. This may be due to the fact that state-owned …rms have a better chance of getting soft budget, as argued in Qian and Roland (1998) that SOEs still experience soft budget constraint. The median loan quota enjoyed by state-owned …rms per annum is about 30 million RMB, in sharp contrast to 9 million for privately-owned …rms in our sample. 25 In the study of Allen et al. (2005) , the SOEs in China received an increasing amount of state budget from 1994 to 2002. They are more able to get …nancial help from the government, but this is not the case for the private …rms in Poncet et al. (2010) . In addition, privately-owned …rms are su¤ering from serve …nanical constrains in the study of Haggard and Huang (2008) . Among all types of ownership, Guariglia et al. (2011) …nd the private …rms are most sensitive to external …nancial constraints. Therefore, improved …nancial markets would especially bene…t private …rms by loosening their external …nancial constraints.
Furthermore, as in the full sample, we consider the indirect in ‡uence and calculate the total marginal e¤ects for state-owned and privately-owned …rms, together with the corresponding corruption and …nancial development thresholds. Figures 10 and 11 indicate that …nancial development and corruption act as substitutes in promoting …rm growth. It can be seen in Figure  10 that the corruption threshold for state-owned …rms (0.22) is higher than that of privately-owned …rms (0.14). Suppose the presence level of corruption is 0.14, …nancial development has no impact on privately-owned …rms' growth, but still generates positive returns for the state-owned …rms. Once surpassing corruption thresholds, the negative impact of …nancial development on …rm sales income growth is bigger for the privately-owned …rms, while for the state-owned …rms are less responsive. This may be because corruption is more predictable for the state-owned …rms like an additional tax. Hence, the external …nance causes less growth-enhancing e¤ect than for the privately-owned …rms under the relatively lower level of corruption. Correspondingly, the growth-reducing e¤ect induced by the …nance is smaller for the state owned …rms when corruption is pervasive.
By analogy, we compute the …nancial development thresholds in Figure  11 . It is noticeable that the …nancial development thresholds are not very di¤erent between the state-owned and privately-owned …rms: corruption imposes positive impact on growth for both types of …rms when they encounter more di¢ culties in obtaining loans (i.e., FD<4) compared with the previous years. When the level of …nancial development is higher than the thresholds, corruption tends to hamper …rm sales income growth and this in ‡uence is greater for the privately-owned …rms. It becomes clearer that the total marginal e¤ect of corruption on …rm growth is more responsive in the case of privately-owned …rms due to the higher uncertainty on corruption compared with the state-owned …rms.
Regional Heterogeneity
Given the large regional disparities in China, it is also possible that the above substituting relationship might not be a common phenomenon across the country. Therefore, we continue using Column (3) of Table 3 to estimate each region. The Southeast and Central regions suggest the consistent and statistically signi…cant estimated coe¢ cients of corruption, …nancial development and the interaction term, shown in Columns (3)-(4) of Table 4 , which is consistent with the estimation of full sample. In other regions, the estimates of these main variables are insigni…cant. It is therefore not of valuable to investigate them further. 26 The direct impact of corruption and …nancial development on …rm growth is positive and much greater in the Southeast than in the Central region. The impact of corruption (…nancial development) on …rm growth in the Southeast is about 6 (5) times that in the Central. This …nding may be driven by the …rm composition in the alternative regions. The proportion of the state-owned …rms is 12.53% in the Southeast, while 29.77% in the Central region. As we have discussed in the previous subsection, the growth of the state-owned …rms bene…ts less from an additional increase in either corrupt practices or …nancial development than do the privately-owned …rms. This micro-level phenomenon appears to add up to the regional level. In addition, di¤erent degrees of competition for the limited available loans may also explain why Southeast is more responsive to external …nance and corrupt practices. In our sample, 47.30% of …rms in the Southeast are privately-owned and 40.18% are foreign-owned, in contrast to 61.17% and 9.06% in turn in the Central area. Referring back to Figure 5 , more foreign-owned …rms feel it easier to access loans than private …rms. Banks are more likely to lend to foreign-owned …rms compared to privately-owned …rms. In our sample, the median loan quota enjoyed by foreign-owned …rms is about 40 million RMB (compared with 9 million RMB for privately-owned …rms as shown earlier), and the value per employee is also highest among three types of ownership. Hence, there is a possibility that the external …nance for privately-owned …rms has been crowded out by the huge amount of foreign-owned …rms in the Southeast, while the situation is less severe in the Central where there are far fewer foreign-owned …rms. This further supports the …nding of Haggard and Huang (2008) that Chinese government gives priority to foreign …rms rather than the domestic private …rms. This is not seen in the experience of East Asian newly industrialized countries except in Singapore. The ownership structure within private …rms may also play a role in their ability to obtain loans. Guariglia et al. (2011) …nd that private …rms that have negligible foreign participation (lower than 10% of ownership) and operate in the coastal region are subject to the highest competition for external funds and therefore, bene…t most from higher cash ‡ow. In our sample, over 95% of the private …rms in the Southeast have less than 10% foreign ownership. 26 If not controlled for the interaction term, …nancial development suggests signi…cantly positive impact on …rm growth in Bohai, Northeast, Northwest and Southwest, while corruption is never signi…cant. As the estimates are insigni…cant, the 95% con…dence intervals for the interaction terms are wide with the upper and lower bounds being above and below the horizontal axes respectively and moving towards the alternative directions. A conclusive …nding can not be made on how corruption a¤ects …rm growth conditional on …nancial development in these regions. Estimated results are available upon request. With regard to the indirect e¤ect, in terms of the interaction term of corruption and …nancial development, Figure 12 and 13 show that they appear to be substitutes in both the Southeast and Central regions. Similarly to the full sample case, we calculate the total marginal e¤ects of corruption and …nancial development at the regional level and the corresponding corruption and …nancial development thresholds. Figure 12(a) suggests that if a …rm in the Southeast spends more than 12% time of a year (44 days) handleing government relationships, easier access to loans would not bring more sales income, but rather deter its growth. Likewise, in Figure 13(a) , if a …rm in the Southeast …nds it di¢ cult to obtain loans (FD<3.62), the improvement in governance would provide lower bene…t to its growth. This …nding also underlines a nonlinear relationship between corruption and …rm growth. Furthermore, it can be seen from Figure 12 that when the quality of governance is not very poor (below the corruption threshold in the Southeast, 44 days), better access to loans tends to bring a stronger growth-enhancing e¤ect for the Southeast, the area with more foreign-owned …rms, compared to the Central. Similarly, in Figure 13 , if …nancial markets are not well functioned (below the …nancial development threshold, 3.62), the presence of corruption appears to promote …rm growth more in the Southeast. Conversely, it is also worth noting that, when the …nancial markets are well developed (the quality of governance is very low), the presence of corruption (the …nance) suggests a stronger growth-deterring e¤ect for the Southeast. To conclude, compared to the Central, the richer Southeast seems to enjoy as well as su¤er more from the impact of corruption on …rm growth, which largely relies on the development of …nancial markets.
Conclusion
Corruption is detrimental to economic growth in the consensus view of development experts. Nevertheless, it may hamper growth to a lesser or greater degree depending on other social and economic factors. Empirical evidence suggests that not all countries with widespread corruption have su¤ered poor growth performance. China, as one of the "East Asian paradox" countries, has grown remarkably well in spite of high levels of corruption. This paper has sought to provide an explanation of the above puzzle from micro-level. We investigated how …rm growth is a¤ected by the presence of corruption and how the former relationship varies according to …nancial development. In addition, we examined in-depth whether the previous results change across types of ownership and regions.
Our results con…rm the accepted facts that …rm growth is promoted by a well functioned …nancial market. Importantly, the high corruption but fast growth puzzle is resolved by the micro-level evidence that corruption committed by …rms indeed enhances the growth of their sales income. This phenomenon has been further investigated by the interaction term of corruption and …nancial development. The negative impact of the interaction term on …rm growth, indicates that corruption and …nancial development are substitutes to promote …rm growth. Therefore, if one is worse, a stronger growth in ‡uence is caused by increasing the other. However, this substitution relationship does not always bene…t …rm growth. The growth-enhancing e¤ect of corruption diminishes along with the …nancial development; …nancial development bene…ts …rm growth more where there is less corruption. Similar results as full sample, can be particularly observed for the privately-owned …rms and in the Southeast region. A slightly weaker e¤ect is detected for the state-owned …rms and in the Central region. It is worth emphasizing that our results are context-speci…c, particular to China. This may not …t well with the conventional consensus of development experts. China is experiencing transition in its institutional and economic development, while the transition involves a variety of reforms. Some of the reforms happen more quickly than others, and many of them are cointegrated with each other in terms of in ‡uencing economic performance. Economic reforms create more opportunities and incentives to engage in corrupt practices (e.g., Bardhan, 1997) , while improvements in institutions largely lag behind. Although low-quality institutions per se are bad for growth, their in ‡uence could be mitigated by the presence of corruption. At the current development stage, corruption helps circumvent cumbersome regulations as "speed money" and therefore, improves e¢ ciency and extends to stimulate economic growth. However, as institutional improvements continue, the bene…ts of corruption will be reduced and eventually exhausted. This implies that corruption could bring some bene…ts during transition, but will ultimately be destructive unless anti-corruption policy is put into place. Additionally, the unique Chinese pattern is partly caused by the common feature of the "East Asian paradox" countries: having well-organised corruption networks. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) demonstrate that corruption is less damaging when it is more organised (or coordinated) because of the internalisation of externalities. Also, a more organised corruption network reduces the uncertainty that corruption generates and hence, causes less damage.
The above two conditions coexists and therefore, we observe the positive impact of corruption on …rm growth during the transition. However, this growth-enhancing e¤ect caused by corruption is transitory. Sustainable growth eventually requires well functioned institutions. Table A1 Construction and justi…cation of variables 
Appendix
Corruption
Share of days per year that the firm spends in dealing with four government departments: taxation, public security, environment and labour and social security. The higher the value, the higher the corruption.
ETC
Log expenditure in business travel, conferences and entertainment per employee, in 2005 prices.
Firm age
No. of years since the firm was established.
Firm size
No. of employees in 2005.
Bulk goods industry b
Whether the firm belongs to the bulk goods industry, yes=1.
Share of state ownership
Shares owned by governments or their agencies.
Share of foreign ownership
Shares owned by foreign investors and/or firms.
Production capacity
Share of real output in the maximum output if all input is used in production.
Sales per employee Total sales per employee in 2003, inflated to the real term in 2005 prices by provincial CPI.
Value of fixed assets per employee
Value of fixed assets per employee in 2003, inflated to the real term in 2005 prices by provincial price indices of fixed investment.
Share of taxes & fees in sales
Share of all taxes and fees in the firm' s total sales in 2005.
Export
Whether the firm directly exports goods, yes=1.
Share of interprov. sales
Share of the firm' s inter-provincial sales in its total sales in 2005.
Note: a. Incomes are inflated to 2005 prices using provincial CPI. The value of fixed assets is inflated to 2005 prices using provincial price indices of fixed asset investment. Both kinds of price indices come from China Data Centre, University of Michigan. b. This categorisation follows World Bank (2006) . Low-value industry includes agricultural and side-line food processing, food production, and textile, garment, shoes and caps manufacturing. Bulk goods industry includes the production of raw chemical materials and chemical products, nonmetal mineral products and smelting and processing of (non)ferrous metals. High value industry includes pharmaceuticals, and medical, electronics and telecoms equipment. 
